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Abstract
Conflicts of interest (COIs) in research have received increasing attention, but many questions arise about how Institutional
Review Boards (IRBs) view and approach these.
Methods: I conducted in-depth interviews of 2 hours each with 46 US IRB chairs, administrators, and members, exploring
COI and other issues related to research integrity. I contacted leaders of 60 IRBs (every fourth one among the top 240
institutions by NIH funding), and interviewed IRB leaders from 34 of these institutions (response rate=55%). Data were
analyzed using standard qualitative methods, informed by Grounded Theory.
Results: IRBs confront financial and non-financial COIs of PIs, institutions, and IRBs themselves. IRB members may seek to
help, or compete with, principal investigators (PIs). Non-financial COI also often appear to be ‘‘indirect financial’’ conflicts
based on gain (or loss) not to oneself, but to one’s colleagues or larger institution. IRBs faced challenges identifying and
managing these COI, and often felt that they could be more effective. IRBs’ management of their own potential COI vary,
and conflicted members may observe, participate, and/or vote in discussions. Individual IRB members frequently judge for
themselves whether to recuse themselves. Challenges arise in addressing these issues, since institutions and PIs need
funding, financial information is considered confidential, and COI can be unconscious.
Conclusions: This study, the first to explore qualitatively how IRBs confront COIs and probe how IRBs confront non-financial
COIs, suggests that IRBs face several types of financial and non-financial COIs, involving themselves, PIs, and institutions, and
respond varyingly. These data have critical implications for practice and policy. Disclosure of indirect and non-financial COIs
to subjects may not be feasible, partly since IRBs, not PIs, are conflicted. Needs exist to consider guidelines and clarifications
concerning when and how, in protocol reviews, IRB members should recuse themselves from participating, observing, and/
or voting.
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Introduction
Conflicts of interest (COIs) in medical research have recently
been receiving increased attention, but many questions arise about
how IRBs view, identify, and manage these problems. COIs are
‘‘conditions where a ‘‘primary interest’’ (e.g., patients’ welfare) is
‘‘unduly influenced by a secondary interest (such as financial
gain)’’ [1]. COIs can be both financial and non-financial (e.g.,
involving desires for professional recognition, etc. [2]), and can
bias research [1,3–7].
Attention to COIs increased after Jesse Gelsinger, an 18-year-
old ‘‘normal,’’ healthy volunteer, died in a 1999 University of
Pennsylvania gene therapy experiment. Subsequently, the princi-
ple investigator (PI) was found to hold shares in the company that
stood to gain millions of dollars, depending on the results. Since
then, COIs among PIs [8–10], as well as IRB members [11] have
been increasingly documented. Generally, PIs must now disclose
COIs to universities, and can hold no more than $10,000 interest
in a company whose products they are studying [12]. The Institute
of Medicine (IOM) [13] recommends that consent forms include
basic information about COIs and state that additional informa-
tion is available on request. But whether this approach suffices,
how much detail should be provided, who would supply it (e.g., a
COI office or IRB), how often subjects request it, and how they
understand it, are unclear.
Key questions remain concerning the roles of IRBs in
identifying and managing their own and PIs’ COIs. Federal
regulations prohibit US IRB members with COIs from partici-
pating in reviews except ‘‘to provide information requested by the
IRB’’ [14]. Yet in one study, though 36% of IRB members had
financial relationships with industry, 23% of those never disclosed
it to the IRB, and 19.4% nonetheless always voted on the protocol
[11]. Of medical center IRBs, one-third do not require that
members disclose financial COI [15], yet one-third of IRB chairs
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when the protocol is discussed. Others argue that IRB members
should disclose COIs, but still participate in IRB deliberations, as
they may have relevant expertise [16].
Yet surprisingly, no studies have examined how IRBs view and
make these decisions. The vast majority of publications on COI
have been theoretical; and the relatively little empirical work
conducted in this area has been quantitative, and examined only
financial, but not other COIs.
Given the many unexplored questions concerning how IRBs
identify and manage PIs’ and their own COI, I conducted an in-
depth semi-structured interview study of views and approaches
among IRB chairs, administrators, and members toward COI and
other aspects of research integrity [17]. The study aimed to
address several critical gaps in knowledge concerning how IRBs
view and approach COI and other integrity issues – e.g., what
kinds of financial and non-financial COI issues IRBs confront,
how they identify and manage these, what challenges they face in
doing so, and how they make and view these decisions. Given the
dearth of knowledge about these questions – the fact that no
studies have examined how IRBs make decisions about COIs or
identify or manage non-financial COI among IRBs – a hypothesis-
generating approach is crucial. I thus used qualitative methods to
allow for detailed explorations of issues that emerged in order to
understand these domains as fully as possible. The interviews shed
light on several other issues as well, regarding central IRBs [18],
variations between IRBs [19], and research ethics in the
developing world [20].
Methods
As described elsewhere [18], I conducted in-depth interviews of
2 hours each with 46 chairs, directors, administrators, and
members. I contacted the leadership of 60 IRBs around the
country, representing every fourth one in the list of the top 240
institutions by NIH funding, and interviewed IRB leaders from 34
of these institutions (response rate=55%). In some cases, I
interviewed both a chair and/or director, as well as an
administrator from an institution (e.g., as the chair thought that
the administrator might be better able to answer certain
questions). From these 34 institutions, I thus interviewed a total
of 39 chairs/directors and administrators. I also asked half of these
leaders (every other one interviewed on the list by amount of NIH
funding) to distribute information about the study to members of
their IRBs, in order to recruit 1 member of each of these IRBs as
well. Thus, I interviewed 39 chairs/directors and administrators,
and 7 other members (1 community, and 6 regular members).
The interview guide (see Appendix S1) sought to obtain detailed
descriptions of participants’ views of RI, COI, IRB responses, and
factors involved. The methods were informed by Grounded
Theory [21].
I drafted the questionnaire, drawing on prior research I conducted
and published literature. Transcriptions and initial analyses of
interviews occurred during the period in which the interviews were
being conducted, and these analyses helped shape subsequent
interviews. The Columbia University Department of Psychiatry
IRB approved the study. All participants gave informed consent.
Once the full set of interviews were completed, subsequent
analyses were conducted in two phases, primarily by myself and a
trained research assistant (RA).
In phase I, we independently examined a subset of interviews to
assess factors that shaped participants’ experiences, identifying
recurrent themes and issues that were then given codes. We read
each interview, systematically coding blocks of text to assign
‘‘core’’ codes or categories (e.g., discussions of COI, or of federal
audits of IRBs and institutions). A topic name (or code) was
inserted beside each excerpt of the interview. We then worked
together to reconcile these independently developed coding
schemes into a single scheme, and prepared a coding manual,
defining each code and examining areas of disagreement until
reaching consensus. We discussed new themes that did not fit into
the original coding framework, and modified the manual when
appropriate.
In phase II of the analysis, we independently performed content
analysis of the data to identify the principal subcategories, and
ranges of variation within each of the core codes. The sub-themes
identified by each coder were reconciled into a single set of
‘‘secondary’’ codes and an elaborated set of core codes. These
codes assess subcategories and other situational and social factors
(e.g., different types of COI, and ways IRBs address these).
Codes and sub-codes were then used in analysis of all of the
interviews. To ensure coding reliability, two coders analyzed all
interviews. Where necessary, multiple codes were used. We
examined areas of disagreement through closer analysis until
consensus was reached through discussion. We checked regularly
for consistency and accuracy in ratings by comparing earlier and
later coded excerpts.
To ensure that the coding schemes established for the core
codes and secondary codes are both valid (i.e., well grounded in
the data and supportable) and reliable (i.e., consistent in meaning),
they were systematically developed and well-documented. We
used Microsoft Word to manage and analyze the data, and search
for words and phrases.
Results
As summarized in Table 1, the 46 interviewees included 28 chairs/
co-chairs; 10 administrators (including 2 directors of compliance
offices);and7members.Inall,27weremale and19werefemale,and
93.5% were Caucasian. Interviewees were distributed across
geographic regions, and institutions by ranking in NIH funding.
As outlined in Figure 1, and described more fully below, IRBs
confronted several broad categories of financial and non-financial
COIs of PIs, institutions, and IRBs themselves. IRB members may
seek to either help, or compete with, principal investigators [PIs]).
IRBs faced challenges and uncertainties in identifying and
managing these COI, and did so in several ways, and felt their
responses could potentially be more effective. These issues are
categorized below as: IRB’s identification and then management
of COIs among PIs, institutions, and IRB members. However,
these categories overlap – i.e., identification and management
issues are often closely intertwined. Financial and non-financial
COI are also frequently hard to disentangle.
Identifying PIs’ COIs
IRBs were often uncertain how to define PIs’ ‘‘COI.’’ The
$10,000 cut-off may not be ideal, since it could mean much more
to a junior than a senior PI. Hence, IRBs were also unclear
whether research should ‘‘not even have ‘‘the shadow of an
appearance’’ of a COI.
Financial COI were also hard to identify and assess because the
future profitability of an investigational product is uncertain. PIs
might accrue profit only in the future, and hence not self-report or
perceive a COI.
Often, surgeons don’t realize that developing equipment
they might eventually sell, or have some interest in, is a
conflict. They are not getting money currently. IRB17
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through an industry-supported CME course. IRBs debated
whether to look ‘‘beyond’’ the immediate source of money alone.
IRBs also face questions of who should identify others’ COIs,
and how engaged to be. Usually, another institutional office
addresses many aspects of COIs, but IRBs nevertheless become
involved to varying degrees. With institutional COI offices, IRBs
had varying relationships that IRBs often felt were inadequate.
One IRB only knew of a major PI COI because of sharing an
office with the grants department. IRBs may also learn of a PI’s
COI from an NIH grant, not from the PI.
There’s not enough interaction between the COI committee
and the IRB. If PIs declare they have a conflict, it goes to the
COI committee to manage or eliminate. But the committee
usually doesn’t send us back a report. They take care of the
COI, and send a letter saying, ‘‘Yes, we are taking care of
it.’’ But we may not know…how… IRB17
The IRB may know only that a plan has been put into place,
and many deduce, but not explicitly apprehend, details. ‘‘We just
get told there’s a conflict, and now a plan. It’s clear when there’s a
change of PI. We figure that’s how they’re resolving the issue’’
(IRB3).
But resolving COIs is often not straightforward, and simply
making a PI a co-investigator may not wholly eliminate it.
Hence, some IRBs have developed a second, separate COI
form, but then face challenges.
The university’s system for annual COI disclosure is only
on-line, and not very good. So, the IRB looks on its own at
protocols to see if there’s any conflict. Every now and then,
there is one. IRB18
The quality of existing COI forms can also thus range widely.
But IRBs may then require that PIs fill out long, additional COI
questionnaires. These instruments may rely, however, on PIs’ self-
disclosures, which might not be accurate. ‘‘We count on the
researchers telling us. It’s fairly reliable, but not perfect. They
might not perceive a conflict that we do’’ (IRB17).
PIs may resist or refuse disclosing COI information to an IRB,
which they see as ‘‘wanting to know everything.’’
Particularly at smaller institutions, confidentiality concerns may
arise since individuals reviewing the information may know PIs
fairly well, and organizational structures may be less formalized.
(‘‘Some things are too personal. I wouldn’t want to be responsible for
keeping that confidential’’ [IRB13]).
PIs may submit differing information on institutional and IRB
COI forms – often because conflicts having now been managed.
Yet IRBs still have to investigate.
Investigators mark the forms incorrectly 15% of the time. It
could be oversight. Or, the PI had managed and gotten rid
of the conflict, and just not updated the database. IRB1
Questions thus arise of whether these additional forms and
processes can be streamlined.
But most IRBs felt too burdened already to adopt added COI
responsibilities. (‘‘We are already in charge of so much’’ [IRB17]).
IRBs may want the added information, but not the added work.
Questions arise, too, about identifying and managing potential
COI in minimal risk research (e.g., structured instruments may be
copyrighted, involving financial gains).
Many interviewees thought that PIs’ non-financial COI were
ubiquitous, but elusive, and hence hard to define, identify, and
manage. IRB members usually acknowledged that in the academic
culture of ‘‘publish or perish,’’ PIs had to accrue some career gain
(e.g., publications, promotions, and grants), creating indirect COI
that can be difficult to discover and monitor. ‘‘Non-financial’’
COIs may manifest themselves in PIs’ aggressiveness in recruiting
and enrolling subjects. Scandals (e.g., the Gelsinger case) may
result from PI egos, and thus continue: ‘‘The researchers were very
aggressive, and wanted to recruit, and treat…That’s going to
happen. Researchers have their own egos and money involved’’
(IRB25).
Yet IRBs tended not to explicitly seek PIs’ non-financial COIs.
Identifying Institutions’ COIs
IRBs may also identify departmental or institutional COIs, but
feel unable to manage these. IRBs struggled with whether to assess
and respond more aggressively to such COIs. Funding could go to
the department, not the PI directly, but still constitute a COI.
Such conflicts can be less obvious, and hence overlooked, and
IRBs may avoid discussing them. ‘‘[These] COI issues can be far
more subtle. And there aren’t any guidelines on that. People are
reluctant to open up that box’’ (IRB12).
Institutional COI could also be ‘‘non-financial’’ (i.e., involving
reputation), but not be easily identified by IRBs or other offices.
The IRB or COI committee reporting to a CEO could itself
represent a COI. Similarly, institutional officials might try to block
research that may question the institution.
Table 1. Characteristics of the Sample.
Total % (N=46)
Type of IRB Staff
Chairs/Co-Chairs 28 60.87%
Directors 1 2.17%
Administrators 10 21.74%
Members 7 15.22%
Gender
Male 27 58.70%
Female 19 41.30%
Institution Rank
1–50 13 28.26%
51–100 13 28.26%
101–150 7 15.22%
151–200 1 2.17%
201–250 12 26.09%
State vs. Private
State 19 41.30%
Private 27 58.70%
Region
Northeast 21 45.65%
Midwest 6 13.04%
West 13 28.26%
South 6 13.04%
Total # of Institutions Represented 34
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022796.t001
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faculty members’ COIs, but not the institution’s COI – those
of the hospital or medical school. The IRB has to regulate
those…Health policy faculty wanted to look at the health
records of university employees to determine if lower paid
employees had the same access to health care as higher paid
employees…The university administration and president
disallowed the protocol, saying they were afraid about loss of
confidentiality of employees’ health records. But, in fact, they
have a COI: what if these researchers find that access to
healthcare is not equitable? The university is at risk, and is
judging whether the research can be done. That’s a COI. In
other research, the hospital itself stands to gain, which can
affect the review of protocols. IRB12
Identifying IRB Members’ COIs
IRBs may not identify their own COIs well. Some IRBs may see
more drug company research as desirable, and feel that they may
receive more drug company business if they review protocols
quicker. Industry-funded PIs may also try to ‘‘game’’ the system,
and engage in ‘‘IRB shopping.’’ Some interviewees felt that that
such practices did not lower the quality of the review, but others
were more wary.
Pharmaceutical companies will throw more research at you
if you have a proven track record. So, from a business
perspective, faster turn-around pays off…As long as you don’t
sacrifice the quality of review, but turn studies around
relatively quickly, everyone benefits – clients, human
subjects…and the pharmaceutical companies. They get
their approvals quickly, and we get to enroll as many
subjects as they need. IRB9
IRBs may see themselves as a business, and highlight business
rather than only ethical outcomes. ‘‘Most PIs have good business
experience working with us, and are satisfied with the 30–40 day
turnaround’’ (IRB9).
Figure 1. Issues Concerning Identification and Manage of IRBs’ Own and Others’ COIs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022796.g001
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organizations (CROs) with separate IRBs, giving PIs choices of
where to submit protocols. Several institutions may co-establish a
de facto CRO.
The objective was to bring clinical trials to the host
institutions. It…now involves an IRB. It is similar to a
CRO…Its focus is industry. IRB9
This director feels that the CRO IRB has advantages over his
own. ‘‘They’re quicker…we’re not as equipped. They have more
resources…it’s a one-stop shop’’ (IRB9).
At times, interviewees perceived COIs among other IRBs –
especially for-profit IRBs. As members of local IRBs, almost all
interviewees thought these commercial boards had financial COIs.
(‘‘They’re in it for the money…’’ [IRB4]). Many perceived and
feared lower standards as a result.
I’m not really sure what standards these so-called private
IRBs uphold, where a doctor doing a study out of their
private practice would just pay money and get some IRB to
approve it. My impression is that the standards are not as
high. I’ve been involved in many multi-site trials, and
someone said, ‘‘That design isn’t going to fly with the
university’s IRB, but the private IRBs will accept it.’’ IRB12
IRB members can also have non-financial COI, but identify or
manage these poorly, if at all. As institutional employees, and often
PIs, IRB members may ‘‘wear many hats,’’ and try to help, not
impede, colleagues or the institution. One female co-chair said,
We are all part of the same club. When a PI came in to
explain his study, it was like a locker room. The guys were very
friendly, chumming around…The IRB is supposed to be
objective, professional. But on a personal level, it may not be
as strict or stringent with friends or long-standing colleagues
than a regional IRB, with no personal relationships, just
dealing with the facts, regulations, and principles…To what
extent do the facts that we are all colleagues, and know the
investigators, affect our performance – our ability to protect
subjects? IRB40
The answer to this question is unclear, yet in this regard,
centralized IRBs may be more objective.
Managing PIs’ COIs
Generally, IRBs recognize colleagues’ and institutions’ needs for
industry funding, but face challenges. Usually, IRBs try to accept a
degree of strain and negotiate, rather than totally eliminate
conflicts (except those clearly beyond $10,000).
Many institutions and/or IRBs now require inclusion of PIs’
COIs in consent forms, but differ in how and to what degree. COI
committees may make these decisions, but IRBs may then have to
decide the specific language. IRBs may thus debate how much and
what information to include. But IRBs don’t know whether
participants know how to interpret and evaluate the information,
whether these disclosures are sufficient, and/or decrease enroll-
ment, and how to decide.
IRBs may also be more conservative than the institutions’ COI
committees in having ‘‘zero tolerance’’ for COI, and more power
to restrict PIs. ‘‘We’re more stringent than the med school. We can
do whatever we think needs to be done’’ (IRB31).
IRBs struggle with whether and how to manage COIs with
relatively low-risk studies, too. One PI, e.g., studied a low-risk
nutritional product that still posed COI questions.
He held interest in a company promoting a nutritional
product he was studying. It was very low risk, so would
probably have had no consequences, but didn’t seem ethically
right. So we proposed that the data be collected and analyzed
anonymously. IRB27
Yet IRBs tended not to seek to manage PIs’ non-financial COIs
in any way.
Managing IRB Members’ COI
IRBs face dilemmas, too, of how, and to what degree to manage
their own COIs, and do so in several ways. They often try to be
‘‘above’’ finances. (‘‘We try consciously to be purer than money. It’s
important that safety predominates’’ [IRB25]). But that goal may
not always be entirely realistic.
IRBs usually seek to manage their own COIs through recusals,
but face dilemmas of whether conflicted members can hear, join,
and/or vote in deliberations, and how to decide. Chairs may tell
members with potential COIs to recuse themselves, but definitions
of such COIs (e.g., whether these include non-financial COIs) can
be unclear.
At meetings, the chair reminds everybody: if you have a
conflict, identify and disclose it, and if you need to, recuse
yourself. They then leave the room before the vote. They
might stay for some of the discussion, and answer questions.
IRB18
IRBs may bar members from discussions, or leave these
decisions to individual members, not all of whom may excuse
themselves. IRBs may also suggest that members recuse
themselves to avoid pressure from dissatisfied PIs. But these
members may continue.
A resident on the IRB reviews protocols, and tells his faculty
what he thinks is wrong. We’ve told him he can recuse
himself – that he needs to worry that his department may
not like him rattling cages, if he’s only a resident…But he
feels OK. IRB32
The specifics of the department, and people involved, thus
differ. Yet permitting members to make these choices on their own
can generate problems.
Conversely, members may recuse themselves from reviewing
competing researchers’ protocols. Yet these abstentions can
present tradeoffs, hampering maintenance of a quorum of
expertise. Some IRBs consist of ‘‘fairly senior people’’ (IRB17),
involved in many studies, who may then often have to recuse
themselves.
Questions arise, too, of when exactly members should recuse
themselves – e.g., when any protocol from a department is
discussed vs. those in which they are more closely involved.
Unconflicted experts in a field can be hard to obtain. Chairs
may have to push outsiders to review.
US IRBs in Identifying and Managing COIs
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sults for all the companies, so can’t review for us…But then
no one on the committee has the expertise. In some ways,
it’s better to have someone involved who knows the field.
IRB3
IRBs may thus face difficult choices.
Some IRBs felt that having a member whose research team’s
work is being reviewed can be both good and bad.
We’ve been pretty good about not being too cozy. One
member is part of a research group…We were pretty tough
on protocols from his group, and he tried to defend or
explain what the researcher was doing, and the discussion
didn’t go his way. On balance, it’s been helpful to have him
to explain the research, because on the face of it, the
research seems a little crazy…exposing healthy subjects to a
particular drug. He can explain it… IRB40
IRBs may attempt to manage COIs, particularly non-financial
ones, in other ways, too. One chair begins every meeting with a
‘‘benediction,’’ suggesting a ritual – a systematic means of
addressing difficult emotions.
We start every meeting with a benediction, saying, ‘‘The things
that we talk about in this room can affect the careers of the
individuals involved. What goes on in this room stays in this room.
Consider it like Las Vegas: we don’t discuss anything outside
of these doors.’’ We really do let our hair down…and call a
spade a spade during those meetings. An individual could be
doing research for the company that makes a drug, or a
competitor, and be conflicted. We allow them to take part in
discussion, but not vote. IRB4
Chairs thus vary in whether they permit conflicted members to
join discussions. Conflicted members in the room, even if not
voting, could, by observing colleagues’ comments and/or votes,
potentially sway decisions.
Discussion
This study, the first to provide qualitative data on how IRBs
confront COIs, and the first to explore how IRBs face non-
financial COIs, reveals that US IRBs struggle to identify and
manage several types of COIs in various ways. IRBs often wrestle
with dilemmas of how to define COI, and balance competing
priorities.
While certain aspects of financial COI among IRBs have been
probed quantitatively [6], the present study highlights additional
ambiguities concerning how IRB members confront non-financial
COI – e.g., whether members with non-financial conflicts should
leave the room. Members can potentially either aid or hamper PIs,
trying to ‘‘help their buddies,’’ or stymie competitors, highlighting
both informal and formal interactions between IRB members and
PIs. These impediments to reviews can be subtle, subjective, and
invisible, and thus hard to detect, manage, or prevent. IRBs’
responses to their own potential COI range considerably, and in
protocol deliberations, conflicted members may observe, partici-
pate, and/or vote. Mechanisms for handling these COI often
appear informal, handled case-by-case, ad hoc.
Definitions of COI can be blurry (e.g., if PIs are developing a
device they might sell in the future). IRBs struggle with whether
they should use, as a standard, PIs not having even the appearance of
a COI, and whether and how much to address COI in minimal
risk studies.
These data highlight critical questions concerning definitions,
identifications and management of non-financial COIs, too. While
prior discussions distinguish between financial and non-financial
COI, distinctions arise here more commonly between direct and
indirect financial COIs. Non-financial COI have been described,
based on political or other commitments (e.g., being a smoker)
[22], allegiance to a particular theoretical framework [23], or
career advancement and ambition [2,24]. But the present data
reveal ‘‘indirect financial COIs’’ based on gain or loss not to
oneself, but to one’s colleagues or larger institution.
At times, IRBs themselves wrestle with competing priorities –
e.g., managing COI vs. having a quorum, and/or sufficient
expertise; and avoiding COI vs. helping the institution. To gauge
COIs, IRBs often rely on trust of PIs and each other – e.g.,
‘‘knowing’’ that local PIs would not have a COI, and/or would
readily report it. But such trust may not always be fully justified.
Physicians may be unconscious of COIs [25], and deny these; and
so, too, may many IRB members. Similarly, IRBs may under-
appreciate how COIs may affect them, feeling immune, and hence
minimizing or denying these. These issues need to be examined far
more closely by IRBs, policy makers, and others, and raise broader
dilemmas of how to assess trust.
One could argue that IRB COIs with PIs can cut both ways –
helping or hindering PIs – and that these phenomena in effect thus
cancel each other out. But such ‘‘balancing’’ may not always
occur. Rather, at any one time, an IRB may tilt more one way or
the other.
These data highlight inefficiencies in current bureaucratic
structures for overseeing COIs. Separate institutional COI offices,
other than IRBs, may know of, and manage PIs’ financial COIs.
But IRBs may not then learn of the resultant decisions, though
IRBs would often like to, in order to review protocols fully, and
assess consent forms. Thus, these institutional structures and
relationships can be improved, to share relevant information.
Disclosures of both financial and non-financial COIs to study
subjects, though suggested [26], may not be feasible or realistic for
indirect financial COI. Partly, IRBs, not PIs, are conflicted. It may
not make sense for informed consent forms to state, essentially,
‘‘The IRB may also have tried to help the PI by approving this
study.’’ In academic institutions, needs for career advancement
pose intrinsic, indirect, and non-financial COI. Consequently,
enhancing awareness and education about these COIs among
IRBs, chairs, members, and administrators, PIs, and other
institutional officials is critical.
Needs exist to consider possible guidelines and clarifications
concerning when and how IRB members should recuse themselves
from discussing, reviewing, and/or voting on, protocols. IRB
members may know many PIs, potentially posing COIs. Hence,
the criteria should not be whether members know the PI, but to
what degree that knowledge may affect deliberations. Yet these
determinations can be highly subjective. Nevertheless, guidance
can potentially help members, chairs, and administrators make
these decisions.
Central IRBs, including for-profit IRBs, though increasingly
proposed [27], may also have inherent COIs. For-profit IRBs get
paid to approve protocols [7], yet interviewees may also have COI
in potentially wanting to aid or hinder PIs. Still, debates about
CIRBs rarely mention that local IRBs may have certain COIs, too.
Both local and centralized IRBs may face potential COIs that
need to be weighed in discussions about changing the current
system.
US IRBs in Identifying and Managing COIs
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 July 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 7 | e22796Additional research is needed, too, to assess more fully when,
how, and in what ways direct and indirect financial COIs in fact
affect IRBs, and how and to what degree educational or other
interventions can help. Such research will face challenges, but is
important in optimally protecting participants.
This study has several potential limitations. These data are
based on interviews with individual IRB chairs and members, but
not direct observation of IRB decision-making, or collection of
written IRB records. Future research can also observe IRBs and
examine such records. But these data may be difficult to obtain if
IRBs require that all the IRB members, PIs, and funders involved
provide informed consent. Nevertheless, the present data provide
important insights on these issues. These interviews also probed
respondents’ experiences and views in the present and recent past,
but not prospectively. IRBs and Research Ethics Committees
(RECs) abroad may also vary, and can be explored future
research.
Nevertheless, this study highlights how US IRBs confront
several types of COI, and face challenges and ambiguities in
defining, identifying, and managing these tensions. Further
research and attention concerning these issues is urgently needed.
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